IntroductIon
The remarkable increase in cohabitation over the last few decades, both in the United States and in other countries, has created a variety of new family relationships, not only between the adults involved but also between the adults and their children. U.S. law has failed to respond to these new circumstances, which have profound effects for the individuals involved. In this Article, I focus on just one of those relationships: the relationship between a child living in the household of a cohabiting couple and the cohabitant who is in a position analogous to that of a stepparent -the partner of the child's biological parent. If the cohabitants are of the same sex, this topic has been 128 
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[Vol. 13:127 extensively explored both in litigation and scholarly literature. 1 My focus will therefore be on children living with opposite-sex cohabiting couples, which has not been the subject of a great deal of discussion. I limit my discussion here to issues of custody, visitation, and child support, and will address other issues, such as inheritance and receipt of government benefits, in future work.
Why is this an issue with which family law should be concerned? Perhaps the easiest way to answer this question is to contemplate what scenarios occur if the nonbiological children of cohabitants are considered, as they are now, to be legal strangers to the cohabitant in the position of a stepparent to them. If the child's biological custodial parent dies, the surviving cohabitant has little chance of obtaining custody unless he or she works out an informal agreement with the child's noncustodial biological parent. If the issue is adjudicated, the child will almost certainly be transferred to the custody of the other biological parent, perhaps living with a biologically related person who is truly a stranger, rather than allowed to remain in the household where he or she has been living.
2 If the cohabiting relationship terminates by dissolution rather than death, moreover, the child has no legal right to any contact with a person who may have long been her primary caretaker, the only father she ever knew, or with children she considers brothers and sisters. If the child has been living with the mother's cohabiting partner, both mother and child are likely to have become economically dependent on that partner, and separation of the adult cohabitants can amount to a sudden and immense economic disaster for the child.
In Part I below, I discuss the relationship between cohabitants and the children in their households and the effects that relationship may have upon the children's welfare. There is a limited amount of information available on this topic from studies of cohabiting families, but a large social science literature exists about stepfamilies headed by married couples, about the relationship between stepparents and stepchildren, and about how children fare in these families. The residential stepparent-stepchild relationship is the closest analogy to that between a cohabitant and his or her partner's child, with one difference: the stepparent has legally enforceable obligations to the child's parent and the cohabitant does not. I will draw upon the literature about married stepparents to supplement what we know about cohabitants' children. After reaching some conclusions about whether this relationship is one of value, I explore in Part II the current treatment in U.S. law of both married and unmarried stepparent-stepchild relationships and the inadequacy of this treatment.
Before suggesting appropriate legal rules to govern this situation, I review in Part III various recommendations that have been made in the literature about married stepparents, as well as the approaches taken in some other countries. Finally, I discuss what the legal treatment of cohabitants' relationships with their "stepchildren" should be. Unlike the approach suggested in my previous writing, 3 here I argue that a more nuanced approach may be desirable where children are involved, one that is sensitive to the diversity of relationships likely to exist between a cohabitant and a nonbiological child living in his or her household.
I. What do We KnoW about the relatIonshIp betWeen cohabItants and theIr "stepchIldren"?
A
. Statistics About Cohabitants with Children in Their Households
Although the census regularly and systematically underestimates the numbers of cohabitants and their children, 4 it is clear that this new family form is shared by large and increasing numbers of people in the United States. The 2000 census reported that there were 4.9 million unmarried-partner households, and thus at least ten million people living with a person of the 3 I have previously argued that cohabitants should be treated as though they were married after they have lived together for two years and/or have a child in common, see cyNthia graNt BowMaN, uNMarrieD couPleS, law, aND PuBlic Policy 224-28 (2010); see also opposite sex as an unmarried partner. 5 The 2010 census indicated that this number had increased to 7.529 million couples. 6 Children live in about forty percent of all cohabiting households.
7 By 2009, it was possible to estimate the number of these children at 4,134,000, or almost six percent of all children in the United States.
8 About half are the biological children of both cohabitants, and about half are children of one of the cohabitants, typically (seventy-five percent) of the woman. 9 The statistics differ dramatically by race and ethnic group. One 1996 study reported, for example, that eight percent of Puerto Rican children, five percent of Mexican American and Black children, and three percent of non-Hispanic white children live in cohabiting families.
10

B. The Impact of Cohabitation on Children in These Households
The fact that a child's parent is a cohabitant has a variety of impacts on a child's life, both economic and psychological. Because the literature studying these effects is in its infancy, I supplement it here with insights gleaned from the voluminous literature about stepfamilies.
11
First, women and children gain by the addition of a cohabitant's income to the household, a virtually identical income premium from either cohabitation or marriage -a gain of roughly fifty-five percent in needs-adjusted total 5 u.S. ceNSuS Bureau, supra note 4, at 1. 
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Cohabitants and Their Partners' Children 131 family income. 12 If the cohabiting relationship ends, women cohabitants lose about one third of their household income, leaving them with levels of household income similar to that of divorced women. 13 The impact is particularly severe upon African American and Hispanic women and their children.
14 Taking the income of cohabitants living in a household into account makes a dramatic difference in the official poverty statistics. In 2000, for example, 39.7% of children living with cohabiting couples were reported to be living in poverty, but this fell to 20.1% if the cohabiting partner's income was taken into account. 15 In other words, cohabitation substantially reduces the numbers of children living in poverty. 16 A serious problem for children living in these households is that cohabiting unions are less stable than marriages, so the improvement in economic situation may not be long-lasting. Fifty percent of children living with cohabitants will experience the dissolution of their parents' relationship by the time they are five (versus fifteen percent of children of married parents), and two thirds by the time they are ten. 17 Again, the likelihood of disruption varies by subgroup, with forty percent of Hispanic and non-Hispanic white children born to cohabiting couples and sixty percent of comparable African American children confronting this loss by age five.
18 While some part of the difference 
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Stepfathers are similar to cohabitants in the economic advantage they confer upon both the new wife and her children; thus similar problems are presented if stepfamilies dissolve. 24 Studies have also shown that stepchildren do not fare as well as biological children in a number of ways. 25 For example, significantly less money is invested in the college education of stepchildren. 26 There is also evidence that stepmothers do not invest as much in their stepchildren as they do in their own biological children if the stepfamily is a "blended" one.
27
Stepparents are a very disparate group -male and female, residential and nonresidential, having their own children either by previous unions or together. 28 The quality of a stepparent-stepchild relationship varies not only with individual characteristics of the two parties, but also with the age of the child at the time of the remarriage and the length of time the two have lived together. 29 In other words, the younger a child at the time a stepparent enters his or her life, the more likely that the two will develop a strong bond. Adolescent children are difficult for a stepparent to bond with, and there are indications that they tend to fare worse in stepfamilies in general. 30 Similarly, studies of children living with cohabitants show that the impact of cohabitation varies with the age of the child, with adolescents experiencing more emotional and behavioral problems and six-to eleven-year-olds experiencing lower levels of engagement in school, after controlling for parental economic resources. 31 The quality of the stepparent-stepchild relationship can also vary based on the degree of involvement of the child's nonresidential parent. In this and in other respects, stepfathers tend to have an easier time than stepmothers. Their counterparts, noncustodial fathers, play a peripheral role in most children's lives and may become even less active after the mother remarries.
32 Less is expected of stepfathers than of stepmothers, given widespread cultural expectations of the role of a mother within a family; this works to the advantage of stepfathers in entering this new relationship, which it is important to build slowly. 33 The more detached parenting style of fathers and of stepfathers can assist in this transition. 34 Yet stepfathers are a varied group in this respect as well. Some choose to become very involved in the lives of their stepchildren, and may even come to replace the natural father in the child's life if the noncustodial parent plays little role in it and the new marriage lasts a considerable period of time. 35 Other stepparents, of whichever sex, choose to remain distanced Stepmothers are much rarer than stepfathers (eighty-six percent of residential stepparents are male and, as noted above, seventy-five percent of cohabiting stepparents). 37 The role of a stepmother is very challenging, in part because noncustodial mothers typically play a larger role in their children's lives. 38 The continuing presence of two mothers, with all of the cultural expectations placed upon mothers, can present not only a conflictual situation for the two women but also a conflict of loyalty for the child. 39 Moreover, our societal assumptions about "mothering" result in more intensive interaction with the stepchild, increasing the potential for conflict. 40 In short, the relationships between children and their stepparents clearly differ in a number of ways from the relationships children have with parents with whom they have lived since birth. This is a disadvantage stepchildren share with children both of single mothers and of cohabitants. 41 However, large numbers of American children no longer live in married families with their biological parents, and stepfamilies of various sorts are currently the fastest growing family form and include the largest group of residential parents. 42 It is frequently assumed that the stepparent-stepchild relationship will simply disappear if the parent's marriage dissolves. Studies of stepfamilies across time show that this is not necessarily true. Although some stepchildren no longer think of their former stepparents as part of their family system after divorce, for others this relationship continues to be important. 43 continuation, unsurprisingly, appears to depend upon the length of the relationship, the age of the child at its initiation, the strength of the bond formed, and the nature of the divorce. 44 Even if the child's parent goes on to marry again, it is important in many cases to protect these relationships; doing so can preserve important emotional and material resources derived by stepchildren from them. 45 Contrary to the exclusive parenthood assumption underlying U.S. family law, additional adults in a child's life can be valuable in many ways; and it is now commonly accepted that children are able to adjust to multiple "parents" -indeed, that those relationships may prove helpful or essential to their needs. denial. 47 Unless a stepparent has adopted his or her stepchild, which is rare, 48 the stepparent-stepchild relationship has been regarded as derivative of the relationship to the other parent and thus not to survive termination of the marriage. 49 Appellate courts have repeatedly reversed trial court awards of custody to stepparents. 50 The reasons for doing so include the strong preference, or presumption, for custody in a fit natural parent; American law is also very protective of the rights of noncustodial parents yet reluctant to recognize more than two parents.
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To assert a claim to custody, a stepparent must first establish standing based either on a state statute concerning third-party custody or by showing that he or she is a psychological or de facto parent to the child, or stands in loco parentis, all of which require the stepparent's intentional assumption of an active parental role in the child's life and the existence of a parent-child relationship between them. 52 After establishing standing, the stepparent must still defeat the parental presumption, which can be difficult to do in the absence of a finding of parental unfitness. Although developing case law in some areas indicates that this presumption may be rebutted by showing detriment to the child if not placed in the custody of the stepparent, in other states, a court may simply deny standing to a stepparent. For example, in a 2001 New York case, a nonbiological father had lived with a young child and the child's mother for six years, during which they had formed a close and loving relationship, but the court found that he did not even have standing to be heard on the question of custody. Courts have nonetheless found ways to award custody to stepparents, both married and unmarried, in extraordinary cases where a child's welfare demands this result. The case most frequently cited as an example is In re Allen, 54 a 1981 case in which a married stepmother was awarded custody of her deaf stepson without a finding that the biological parents were unfit. Neither his divorced parents nor his grandparents appeared capable of dealing appropriately with his disability, but his stepmother taught him sign language, learned it herself, and found him special educational training, as a result of which he flourished. 55 In the custody contest that accompanied the couple's separation after four years of marriage, the court awarded custody to the stepmother based on the best interest of the child. The court of appeals affirmed, but held that the best interest standard was not appropriate in a case involving a nonparent, instead making a kind of intermediate finding that the father was unsuitable to parent this particular child with his special needs and the child's development would be detrimentally affected by placement with him. 56 Thus custody was awarded to the stepmother without terminating the father's relationship to his son. The outcome of this case, commentators agree, was a good one, but the judge was stretching the law to reach it. 57 Similarly, a cohabiting stepmother who had been the primary caretaker of her former partner's diabetic daughter for six years was awarded custody in a North Carolina case because neither the father nor his elderly parents were able to care appropriately for her diabetes. 58 (The child's biological mother had been in a comatose and vegetative state since the birth.
59
) Again, the court clearly was reaching beyond accepted legal categories to avoid what it considered a tragic outcome, awarding custody without requiring In short, whether it involves stretching the law or developing a new and intermediate standard, courts do in rare cases award custody to a stepparent. This is most likely when, for example, a natural parent has left a child in the custody of the stepparent for a lengthy period or when a mother has allowed her husband to believe that he was the child's biological parent and he has played an active parenting role since birth. 61 Courts also appear to be more sympathetic to stepparent claims in cases where the child has been living with a natural parent and a stepparent for some time and the natural parent dies.
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But the case law is conflicting and varies from state to state. 63 60 See, e.g., Kinnard v. Kinnard, 43 P.3d 150, 153-54 (Alaska 2002) (awarding joint custody to a stepmother who had served as a child's "psychological parent" during her six-year marriage to the girl's father because to sever the relationship would cause severe harm to the child). 61 Price v. Howard, 484 S.E.2d 528 (N.C. 1997) (holding that a father who had been told, falsely, that he was the child's biological father, and to whose care the mother essentially abandoned the child for several years, may be given custody based on the best interest of the child); see also 
B. Unmarried and Married Stepparents Under Current U.S. Law: Visitation
While neither married nor cohabiting stepparents are likely to gain custody, they will be treated differently from each other with respect to visitation. A married stepparent is increasingly likely to be awarded visitation upon dissolution of the marriage, but the second parent in a cohabiting relationship must struggle even to obtain access. Many petitions for visitation by cohabitants are dismissed simply for lack of standing, preventing any hearing on the merits of the particular case. 64 Others founder on the requirement that a nonbiological parent show that denial of visitation would clearly be detrimental to the child or that other extraordinary circumstances exist, a difficult standard to overcome. 65 In one Iowa case, for example, a woman had lived for five years with a young child and his father, who was a truck driver frequently away from home; she had served in the role of the child's primary parent on a daily basis. 66 When the relationship between the adults ended after the birth of two additional children, she was denied visitation even though this also terminated the boy's relationship with his two half-sisters and despite the court's own belief that visitation was in the child's best interest. The Iowa Supreme Court held that it had no authority to grant visitation to a nonparent in the face of the biological parent's opposition. former cohabitant with whom the child had lived for a year after her biological mother had left the state in the absence of extraordinary circumstances). Thirdparty visitation statutes often set a higher standard for custody than for visitation, requiring, for example, proof that "it would be significantly detrimental to the child to remain or be placed in the custody of either of the child's living legal parents who wish to retain or obtain custody," ariZ. reV. Stat. Most states now have statutes that allow visitation by third parties, usually inspired by grandparents' desire for visitation after the death or divorce of their own child, the grandchild's parent. Most of these statutes are limited by their terms to grandparents and some include stepparents, but several define the third parties broadly enough to include former cohabitants. 68 The statute regarding visitation by unmarried persons in Minnesota, for example, provides that cohabitants of two years' duration are entitled to a hearing on the question of visitation and entitled to visitation if they can show that they have bonded closely with their former cohabitant's child, that visitation would be in the child's best interest, that it would not interfere with the child's relationship to its biological parent, and that, if the child is old enough, the child wants to continue the relationship with the former cohabitant.
69
Cohabitants unable to take advantage of a third-party visitation statute have asserted standing based on the de facto parent doctrine, on their status in loco parentis or as a psychological parent, or on other equitable doctrines. These doctrines have been developed most extensively and successfully in the context of cases involving lesbian couples who have had children by artificial insemination of one of the partners. 70 This situation is quite different from that of a stepparent, who enters the family only as a consequence of a relationship to the biological parent some time after the child was born. Nonetheless, the developing case law about lesbian parents encourages courts to decide cases regarding opposite-sex cohabiting parents under it. For example, in one of the first cases to hold that a court had equitable powers to grant visitation to a lesbian in a parent-like relationship, the Wisconsin Supreme Court specifically child and all third parties except for the other biological parent prevented the court from granting visitation to a man who had served in the role of the child's father and supported her for several years); Ash v. Kotecki, 507 N.W.2d 400 (Iowa 1993) (holding that there is no basis under common law or statute to grant visitation to a man who had lived with a child for one year and exercised visitation with her for four years after cohabitation ended). 68 Pollet, supra note 11, at 533-34. relied upon its own prior case governing the dissolution of a relationship between opposite-sex cohabitants. 71 Justice Shirley Abrahamson provided a structure of analysis that has been borrowed by courts in other states, holding that a court should proceed to decide whether visitation is in the best interest of the child if the petitioner proves four elements:
(1) [T]hat the biological or adoptive parent consented to, and fostered, the petitioner's formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship with the child; (2) that the petitioner and the child lived together in the same household; (3) that the petitioner assumed obligations of parenthood by taking significant responsibility for the child's care, education and development, including contributing towards the child's support, without expectation of financial compensation; and (4) that the petitioner has been in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to have established with the child a bonded, dependent relationship parental in nature.
72
Other courts, following Justice Abrahamson's analysis in same-sex parent visitation cases, have specifically agreed that the same standard would govern a case involving unmarried opposite-sex couples as well.
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Some states have concluded that the Supreme Court's decision in Troxel v. Granville 74 prevents such a conclusion, whether the former partners were of the same or opposite sex. 75 In Troxel, involving visitation by grandparents, the Supreme Court found that Washington's visitation statute was unconstitutionally broad because it did not defer to a fit parent's determination that visitation was not in the child's best interest. The visitation statute in California, for example, purports to award visitation to stepparents based on a best interest finding 86-87, 93 (Md. 2008 ) (refusing to follow pre-Troxel Maryland case law and holding that the court erred in granting visitation to a nonbiological lesbian mother on the grounds that she was a de facto parent without finding either that the biological mother was unfit or that exceptional circumstances overcame the parental presumption).
alone, raising the question of its constitutionality under Troxel. 76 In 2003, a California appellate court held that courts deciding cases under this statute must nonetheless apply the Troxel-mandated presumption that the natural parents were acting in the child's best interest in opposing visitation and that " [w] here natural parents are unified in opposition, nonparental visitation can be ordered only if such visitation is in the best interest of the child and denial of visitation would be detrimental to the child."
77 Similarly, when interpreting its own visitation statute in light of Troxel in a case involving cohabitants, Arizona read a parental presumption into it, holding that "the court should apply a rebuttable presumption that a fit parent's decision to deny or limit visitation was made in the child's best interests." 78 Other states with third-party visitation statutes broad enough to cover cohabitants include some form of the parental presumption in their text, but it is unclear how the presumption could be rebutted.
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Despite substantial legal obstacles, cohabitants have in a few cases succeeded in asserting standing to seek visitation. 80 The former cohabitant must still go on to convince the court that visitation is in the child's best interest, and he or she is unlikely to succeed if there is another biological parent or parent figure of the same sex in the picture.
81
The legal treatment of married stepparents is somewhat better, but nonetheless inadequate. Courts have long been more willing to award visitation to stepparents than to award them custody. 82 Typically a stepparent will seek visitation based on the in loco parentis doctrine or as a de facto or psychological parent. 83 In making its decision, the court will take into account factors such as the length of the relationship, the age of the child, any detriment to the child in cutting off contact, and, if the child is old enough, the child's own wishes. 84 It is clearly easier to show that cutting off all contact after a stepparent-stepchild relationship of long standing would be detrimental to a child than to show that custody should be vested in a nonparent, as courts and commentators have come to believe that continued contact with a stepparent after divorce is generally in the child's best interest.
85
C. Unmarried and Married Stepparents Under Current U.S. Law: Child Support
Traditionally, stepparents had no duty to support their stepchildren other than indirectly, by support of the child's natural parent if they were married. 86 Some argue that to impose a support obligation as a matter of law would be a disincentive to remarriage, or at least a disincentive to marry someone with children. 87 As of 2000, however, eighteen states had passed statutes imposing such an obligation upon stepparents during their marriage to the child's parent. 88 Some states with stepparent support statutes specify that the child's natural parent remains primarily responsible for his or her support and the stepparent is secondarily liable.
89 By contrast, the New Hampshire Supreme Court has held that the duty to stepchildren is identical to that owed to the stepparent's own biological children. 90 Other states' courts have reached conflicting conclusions about this allocation.
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In some states, a duty of support has been derived from the stepparent's assumption of parental responsibility under the common law in loco parentis doctrine. 92 This obligation, like that to a spouse during the marriage, is enforceable only by creditors, not by the children. 93 It may nonetheless arise in a number of situations involving the stepparent's support obligations to children of a previous union, the child support obligation of the noncustodial parent, and the calculation of needs-based government benefits.
A more controversial question is whether a stepparent has a child support duty after divorce from the child's natural parent. The doctrines of in loco parentis or de facto parenthood are of little help to a parent seeking child support from a former stepparent, because each status is voluntary and can be terminated at will. 94 The state of North Dakota imposes such an obligation by statute so long as the stepchildren remain in the stepparent's family, but not after divorce from the child's biological parent. 95 The courts in some other states impose a duty of continued support on the basis of equitable estoppel, where, for example, a stepfather has accepted a child into his family, treating him as his own, and represented to the child that he was in fact his father.
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A similar logic, based on detriment to the child from long reliance upon the stepparent, underlay the leading case on this issue, the 1984 decision of the 88 If the parties have lived together as a family for six months or more, there should be a presumption in favor of visitation if both the child and excohabitant desire it. 120 Sudden disruption of a relationship with a member of their functional family is not healthy for children; and studies have shown that they are adaptable in adjusting to, and benefit from, relationships with multiple parents. 121 To incorporate this proposal into American law, a state's highest court must successfully distinguish the relationship between cohabitants and their partners' children from that between children and their grandparents, to escape the parental presumption set out in Troxel. In the typical case, children will not have lived with their grandparents, but only have visited with them while the parents were together. A cohabitant, by contrast, has lived with his partner's child, sharing home and daily life for some time, and may even have served as the primary caretaker. In lesbian co-parenting cases, courts are beginning to recognize that Troxel should not apply. If the nonbiological partner is found, based on a four-part test like that set forth above, to be a de facto parent, the dispute is no longer between a parent and a third party but between two parents. 122 Although similar reasoning should apply to a stepparent, courts have resisted following it because the interests of more than two persons would then be involved. 123 As for child support, after a period of two years of co-residence with the child -a period after which one may presume that family members have become economically interdependent 124 -a cohabitant should be liable for child support upon separation from the child's parent. A sudden cessation of support can have disastrous consequences for children living in cohabiting families. Support should be apportioned between the two ex-cohabitants and the child's other natural parent, so as not to encourage the disappearance of the noncustodial parent from the child's life; but they should be jointly liable for it.
Like Professor Bartlett, I do not think we can simply rely on judges to make extralegal decisions to rescue children in deserving cases, nor do I think that would be good for the legitimacy of our system of family law. Instead, any new standards should be established by statute, to prevent, insofar as possible, inconsistent and unpredictable judicial decisions in this area. With clear expectations, moreover, cohabiting couples who are separating can make arrangements in the shadow of the law, ones that serve the interests of the child even when those interests may conflict with the parents' own preferences. Finally, procedures should be designed to ensure that the voice of the child, if old enough, will be heard during the process of making decisions on these issues. None of this will be possible, however, unless U.S. law gives up its stubborn adherence to the principle that a child cannot have more than two parents.
